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Abstract
Bank liability guarantee schemes have traditionally been viewed as costless measures
to shore up investor confidence and stave off bank runs. However, as the experiences
of some European countries, most notably Ireland, have demonstrated, the credibility
and effectiveness of these guarantees is crucially intertwined with the sovereign’s fund-
ing risks. Employing methods from the literature on global games, we develop a simple
model to explore the systemic linkage between the rollover risks of a bank and a gov-
ernment, which are connected through the government’s guarantee of bank liabilities.
We show the existence and uniqueness of the joint equilibrium and derive its compara-
tive static properties. In solving for the optimal guarantee numerically, we show how its
credibility may be improved through policies that promote balance sheet transparency.
We explain the asymmetry in risk-transfer between sovereign and banking sector, fol-
lowing the introduction of a guarantee as being attributed to the resolution of strategic
uncertainties held by bank depositors and the opacity of the banks’ balance sheets.
Keywords: bank debt guarantees, transparency, bank default, sovereign default, global
games
JEL classification codes: G01, G28, D89
1. Introduction
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, a great many, in par-
ticular European, countries issued sizable bank debt guarantee programs. In this paper
we analyze the conditions conducive for the success of such schemes. We address this
issue by answering several smaller, but more tractable questions. First, how does a gov-
ernment’s issuance of a banking sector liability guarantee scheme influence the behavior
of sovereign and bank creditors to continue lending? Second, what is the impact of the
guarantee on the ex ante probabilities of banking and sovereign default, as well as on
the likelihood of a systemic crisis? Third, is there a guarantee that optimally trades off
the risk of sovereign and bank default? And finally, how does the effectiveness of the
(optimal) guarantee depend on balance sheet transparency and on the liquidity of banks
and sovereigns alike?
IThe views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not represent the official views of the Bank
of Canada. The authors acknowledge support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through the
Collaborative Research Center (Sonderforschungsbereich) SFB 649 on “Economic Risk”. We thank Flora
Budianto, Miles Rimasch and Liting Zhao for help with the data. Christian Basteck provided valuable
comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are our own.
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The global financial crisis was marked by a severe loss of confidence by investors in
financial markets all over the world. The triggers were revelations of losses on US sub–
prime mortgages and other toxic financial assets by banks. An immediate consequence
was a freeze in interbank money markets, as banks ceased lending to each other.1 Figure
1(a) illustrates this development. It shows the EURIBOR-OIS spread, a measure for
interbank market tensions in the euro area, sharply and abruptly increasing three-fold
following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Figure 1(c) shows the
changes in the spreads for banking sector and sovereign Credit Default Swaps (CDSs),
between January 2007 and late September 2008 (shortly after the default of Lehman
Brothers). Viewed as proxies for the probabilities of default of banks, we note a marked
increase in the fragility of banking sector in several countries.
In light of such deteriorating conditions, governments sought to introduce measures
to shore up confidence in their domestic financial sectors. For many, especially Euro-
pean countries, this included introducing contingent guarantee schemes for retail and
wholesale bank deposits. These schemes were viewed as cost effective measures to stave
off bank runs, whereby governments lend their own creditworthiness to the financial
sector.2 Table A1 provides a brief overview of schemes introduced in several countries.
Figure 1(b) compares the sizes of schemes introduced in several countries, relative to
their GDP. The schemes in Italy and Spain amounted to about 3% and 9% of GDP, re-
spectively, while in Austria and the Netherlands they totaled at, roughly, 30% of GDP.
All these were, however, dwarfed by the measures introduced in Ireland, wherein the
state guaranteed all bank liabilities for a period of two years with no monetary cap. The
broad mandate of the Irish scheme, which amounted to roughly 244% of GDP, followed
from the consensus that, as Patrick Honohan (2010), governor of the Central Bank of
Ireland, noted, "No Irish bank should be allowed to fail".
In general, the guarantee schemes were successful in alleviating banking sector de-
fault risk, yet, at the same time, they led to an increase in sovereign default risk. This
can be seen from Figure 1(d) which compares the change in sovereign CDS–spreads with
the change in banking sector CDSs. Based on this measure, it appears that the increase
in the sovereigns’ default probabilities was of much smaller magnitude than the reduc-
tion in the respective banking sector default probability. This phenomenon indicates that
the guarantees not only led to a re–allocation of risks between banks and governments,
but they may have also reduced economy–wide risks.
The case of Ireland requires particular attention, as it can be considered exemplary
for the dramatic, and systemic consequences that may follow from tying the government’s
funding situation to that of its banking sector by means of debt guarantees. Prior to the
crisis, the Irish economy was considered ‘sound’, with low government debt and deficit,
prospects for growth, and low sovereign funding costs (see Panel (e)). Against this back-
ground, Ireland issued its first bank liability guarantee program in October 2008. The
guarantee had the immediate effect of driving down CDS–spreads for the banking sec-
tor. However, as concerns pertaining to the guarantee’s credibility, and the Irish govern-
ment’s ability to pay out the guarantee, were it to come due, spread through sovereign
creditors, Ireland’s funding costs skyrocketed. Moreover, the guarantee failed to prevent
large withdrawals away from Irish banks to the perceived safe havens like Germany, the
Netherlands or Luxemburg. Figure 1(f) illustrates this trend with the net TARGET2 lia-
1See Taylor and Williams (2008) or Holthausen and Pill (2010) for a detailed investigation of interbank
money markets during the 2007–08 financial crisis.
2See Schich and Kim (2011) for an overview of banking sector safety nets.
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Figure 1: Stylized Facts








Panel (a): Time series of the 3 month Euribor-OIS spreads in basis points.
The marker ‘LB’ indicates the date that Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy
(September 15, 2008). Data taken from Bloomberg.
























Panel (b): Guarantee sizes in % of GDP. Data taken from OECD.











Panel (c): Change in CDS–spreads for banks and sovereigns between 1/1/2007 and
9/25/2008. Bank CDSs are unweighted averages of banks with headquarter in respective
country. Data from Bloomberg.











Panel (d): Change in CDS–spreads for banks and sovereigns between
9/26/2008 and 10/21/2008. Bank CDSs are unweighted averages of banks with
headquarter in respective country. Data from Bloomberg.













Panel (e): Irish spreads over German bund, in basis points. The marker ‘G’
indicates the date that the Irish government introduced the guarantee scheme,
while ‘EU-IMF’ gives the date that the joint European Union and International















Panel (f): Net TARGET2 Liabilities of selected euro area national central
banks against the Eurosystem in millions of euro. Negative values reflect a
Target2-liability, positive numbers a Target2-asset. Data taken from University
of Osnabrück’s Euro Crisis Monitor.
3
bilities of the Irish Central Bank, which serves as a proxy for the cumulative net outflows
of euro denominated liquidity.3 The systemic events culminated in the nationalization of
Anglo-Irish Bank in January 2009, and the Irish government seeking a bail-out on 21
November, 2010, jointly from the European Union’s European Financial Stability Facil-
ity and the International Monetary Fund.
The ‘Celtic crisis’ is far removed from what governments would hope to achieve by
issuing bank debt guarantee schemes. The resulting systemic crisis was a direct con-
sequence of the false belief that a guarantee will shore up investor confidence, without
placing any strain on a government’s own funding needs, and hence, on the credibility in
keeping its guarantee promises. Or, as one financial market participant bluntly put it to
the Wall Street Journal (2011) when asked to comment on the on-going banking sector
problems in the euro area, “How useful would bank guarantees from member states be if
these member states are themselves shut out of financial markets?".
In this paper we present a simple model of a systemic liquidity crisis consisting of a
government, one bank and a large pool of bank and sovereign creditors. Bank creditors
must decide whether to rollover their loans to the bank or to withdraw. Their decisions
depend on the bank’s recourse to liquidity and the contingent guarantee provided for
by the government. Sovereign creditors, in turn, decide on whether to continue lending
to the government or to withdraw. The decisions of sovereign creditors depend on the
government’s available resources and the possible payment of the bank guarantee. Using
standard techniques from the literature on global games, we embed our model in an
incomplete information setting, where creditors face strategic uncertainty concerning the
actions of other creditors, as well as fundamental uncertainty over the bank’s and the
government’s recourse to liquidity. Following well established lines of reasoning, we show
that our model exhibits a unique equilibrium in threshold strategies, and that there are
no other equilibria in non-threshold strategies.
Our model displays strategic complementarities within each group of creditors. That
is, the incentives of individual bank (sovereign) creditors to rollover are increasing in
the mass of bank (sovereign) creditors who also rollover. Furthermore, bank creditors’
incentives to rollover are also increasing in the mass of sovereign creditors who lend to
the government. Hence, sovereign creditors’ actions are strategic complements for bank
creditors. But the converse does not hold. The incentives of a sovereign creditor to lend
are decreasing in the mass of bank creditors who rollover. The actions of bank creditors
are therefore strategic substitutes for sovereign creditors. To better understand the latter
property, suppose that, following the introduction of a guarantee, a large fraction of bank
creditors rollover their loans. However, where the bank to still fail, a large guarantee
payout would come due which would add to the government’s liabilities. Anticipating
such an outcome, sovereign creditors would become doubtful about the government’s liq-
uidity and more reluctant to rollover their own claims. This property of our model must
be interpreted with caution and against the background of the questions that we address.
Although the government in the model wishes to avoid a bank default, we abstract away
from direct payments being made by the bank to the government. If, for example, the
government could collect taxes from the bank, its liquidity situation would be directly
3While the Irish guarantee scheme was introduced in October 2008, the outflows continued until May
2009, when they peaked at approximately e100 billion. While there was a reversal of trends between May
and September 2009, the pace of withdrawals accelerated shortly thereafter and continued through 2010,
and peaking only in January 2011. See Bindseil and König (2012) for details on the role and mechanics of
the TARGET2 system during the financial crisis.
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intertwined with the bank and the strategic substitutes effect would be less pronounced.
However, since such taxes may distort the incentives of the bank to act with prudence
and remain solvent, we abstract from their inclusion in order to derive the ’pure’ strate-
gic interactions between the different groups of creditors.
Finally, using numerical methods we investigate how the optimal guarantee size, and
the welfare properties it induces, relate to the underlying model parameters. The optimal
guarantee is obtained by minimizing a cost of crisis function, which is a weighted sum
of the output losses attributed to individual bank and government defaults, and the sys-
temic crisis. Increases in the ex ante expected recourse to liquidity, for both the bank and
government, lead to larger guarantees. We also find that policies that promote bank’s bal-
ance sheet transparency are welfare enhancing. These gains are further improved with
added balance sheet transparency of the government. We also put forward an expla-
nation for why the reduction in banking sector CDS spreads, following the introduction
of guarantee schemes, was often larger, in absolute magnitude, than the accompanying
increase in sovereign CDS spreads. We argue that the strong reduction in banking sec-
tor CDSs may have been due to the guarantee’s effect of removing strategic uncertainty
among bank creditors, while the higher sovereign CDSs are attributed to the opacity on
bank’s balance sheets.
The paper is structured as follows. We introduce the canonical bank debt rollover
model in Section 3. In Section 4 we introduce the government responsible for managing
the guarantee scheme, but is itself subject to rollover risk from a set of sovereign credi-
tors. The comparative statics properties of this extended model are provided in Section
5. In Section 6 we present numerical results for the effects of transparency in a cali-
brated exercises, and a final section concludes. Most of the mathematics and all proofs
are deferred to the Appendix.
2. Relation to the Literature
The modern theoretical perspective on banks’ maturity and liquidity mismatches, and
deposit guarantees is based on the seminal model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). They
show the existence of multiple, self-fulfilling equilibria for a bank with short-term fi-
nanced illiquid assets. In one equilibrium, the bank is run by all depositors and fails as
its liquid reserves are not sufficient to cover depositors’ aggregate claims. In the second
equilibrium only a small amount of withdrawals occurs and the bank’s liquidity is suf-
ficient to avoid default. The two equilibria are brought about by a mis-coordination of
beliefs. Deposit insurance, which is financed by taxes, helps to overcome this multiplicity
by increasing depositors’ expected payoffs from rolling over. The mere existence of such a
deposit insurance is sufficient to coordinate creditors on the efficient equilibrium and to
avoid a bank run. In equilibrium, the insurance is never paid out.
Morris and Shin (2000) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) solve the multiple equilib-
ria problem by extending the setup of Diamond and Dybvig to an incomplete information
setting where information on the liquidity of the bank, is not common knowledge. By
employing the global games approach of Morris and Shin (1998, 2003) they solve for the
unique equilibrium in threshold strategies. If the information received by depositors is
sufficiently precise and banks’ fundamentals are below a critical threshold, most depos-
itors withdraw, thus causing the bank’s failure. If liquidity is sufficiently strong, then
depositors stay. Importantly, in equilibrium the amount actually paid out due to the
deposit guarantee is low as there are only a few depositors who roll over despite the
bank’s default. This logic has recently been translated to government guarantee schemes
by Kasahara (2009) and Bebchuk and Goldstein (2010). Kasahara considers a standard
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global game model, where creditors to a firm enjoy the benefit of a government-financed
debt guarantee. He shows that the guarantee removes inefficient coordination failures
only if the government combines this policy with an information policy where it provides
a sufficiently precise public signal about the firm’s fundamental. While the guarantee
in Kasahara’s model is exogenously financed, he also considers potential costs that may
arise when the guarantee creates adverse incentives and leads to a moral hazard problem
on the side of the firm.
Bebchuk and Goldstein (2010) consider a stylized global game model where the coor-
dination failure occurs among banks who can decide whether to lend to the real economy
or not. Among other policy measures, they consider how a guarantee of banks’ loans could
overcome the no-lending- or ‘credit-freeze-equilibrium’. Similar to the effect of a deposit
insurance in a bank-run model, they find that when the guarantee is sufficiently high,
the risk of coordination failure may be reduced to zero. Goldstein and Bebchuk focus
especially on the ‘global game solution’ of vanishing fundamental uncertainty and they
conclude that “(...) government’s guarantees (...) do not lead to any capital being spent
(...) this mechanism leads to an improvement in the threshold below which a credit freeze
occurs without any actual cost” (p. 25). The authors nevertheless acknowledge that the
validity of a guarantee mechanism crucially “depends on the credibility of the government
in providing the guarantee” (p. 26). Our model adds to this recent literature by explic-
itly considering the credibility of the guarantee by adding a refinancing problem for the
sovereign guarantor. As will be explained in greater detail below, Goldstein’s and Be-
bchuk’s conclusion still hold in our model whenever fundamental uncertainty vanishes.
Yet, whenever bank creditors face some fundamental uncertainty, the guarantee leads to
a higher default risk of the sovereign.
Cooper (2012) shows a similar result in a multiple equilibrium model of sovereign
debt pricing. He studies how a guarantee by a sound country shifts strategic uncertainty
towards the guarantor. In the absence of fundamental uncertainty, beliefs of creditors are
not affected and the guarantee simply acts as a device that selects the good equilibrium.
Yet, when fundamental uncertainty is present, the guarantee may influence the price
of the sound country’s debt. The guarantee then connects the countries and creates a
contagion channel which was not present before.
Acharya et al. (2011) consider the related problem of financial sector bailouts and
their impact on sovereign credit risk. Bank bailouts are financed by taxing the non-
financial sector of the economy. While the bailout is successful in alleviating problems of
the banks, the higher tax burden of the non-financial sector reduces the economy’s growth
rate. The government’s task is thus to optimize the economy’s welfare and to set the opti-
mal tax rate. We abstract in this paper from taxation and finely focus on the coordination
problem between bank and sovereign creditors. This emphasis on joint coordination fail-
ures allows us to address more clearly the issues of the governments’ “ability-to-pay” and
the credibility of the guarantee. The government in our model then sets the optimal
guarantee in order to minimize the expected costs of crises and coordination failures.
Closely related to our model is the ‘twin crises’ global game of Goldstein (2005), which
also includes two groups of agents, currency speculators who attack a pegged exchange
rate, and bank creditors who hold foreign currency denominated claims against a domes-
tic bank. The (exogenous) political decision by a government to peg the exchange rate
connects the actions of the two groups of agents. The greater the fraction of specula-
tors who attack the currency, the more likely a devaluation of the currency becomes, and
hence the more likely is the bank to default due to the currency mis-match on its balance
sheet. Conversely, the greater the fraction of bank creditors who withdraw their funds,
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the larger is the outflow of foreign reserves, and it becomes more likely that the currency
peg will break down. The actions of bank creditors and speculators are strategic com-
plements. They reinforce each other which gives rise to a vicious circle. In our model
it is also an exogenous political decision, guaranteeing bank debt, that leads to the con-
nection of the actions of sovereign and banking creditors. But in contrast to Goldstein’s
twin crisis theory, only the actions of sovereign creditors are strategic complements for
bank creditors, while bank creditors’ actions are strategic substitutes for sovereign cred-
itors. Moreover, in Goldstein’s model, the bank’s and the sovereign’s financial strength
is determined by the same fundamental, whilst the financial strength of the respective
institutions in our model is driven by different, independently distributed fundamentals.
Global games with different fundamentals have not yet been studied in the literature
to a great extent. Two examples related to our paper are Dasgupta (2004) and Manz
(2010). Dasgupta models financial contagion in a global game between two banks in dif-
ferent regions that are exposed to independent regional shocks. Linkages between banks
are created by cross-holdings of deposits in the interbank market and regional shocks
may, therefore, trigger contagious bank failures in equilibrium. Manz also considers
a global game with two independently distributed fundamentals to study information-
based contagion between distinct sets of creditors of two firms. Creditors have imperfect
information about both, their debtor firm’s fundamental and a common hurdle function
which a fundamental must pass for the respective firm to become solvent. In contrast to
Dasgupta, his model has a sequential structure where creditors to the second firm can
observe whether the first firm failed or not. This observation acts like a common signal
and provides second firm creditors some information about the hurdle which in turn in-
fluences their decision to liquidate their own claim or not. While we also resort to the
assumption of independently distributed fundamentals, creditor decisions are taken si-
multaneously, which implies that informational contagion, based on the observation of a
particular outcome in one refinancing game, cannot occur. Rather, the spill-overs between
the bank’s and the sovereign’s refinancing problem are determined by the guarantee.
3. Canonical bank debt rollover game
In this section, we describe the canonical rollover game that serves as the workhorse
for the remainder of the paper. We introduce an exogenously financed guarantee and
discuss the relationship between balance sheet transparency and the costliness of the
guarantee.
3.1. Model description
A bank, indexed b, is indebted to risk-neutral creditors nb ∈ [0, Nb], where Nb ∈ R+
measures the bank’s exposure to funding illiquidity. Creditors hold identical claims
against the bank with face value of one monetary unit. The bank’s recourse to cash
is summarized by the random variable θb ∼U[−ηb,ηb +θ0b]. The ex-ante mean recourse
to liquidity is given by θ0b/2. We may think of θb as being comprised of two parts. First,
there are the liquid assets (cash) on the bank’s balance sheet, which directly contribute
to increasing θb. Second, the bank can raise cash by entering into secured finance ar-
rangements – for example, repurchase agreements and covered bonds – where it pledges
illiquid assets to investors in exchange for cash. These investors, who are not explicitly
modeled, include other commercial banks, hedge funds, and also the central bank.
Creditors simultaneously decide whether to rollover their loans to the bank, or to
withdraw. We express the set of actions for a typical bank creditor by {0,1}, where 0
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denotes rolling over, while 1 denotes withdrawing. Defining λb ∈ [0,1] as the fraction of
bank creditors who withdraw, the bank defaults whenever aggregate withdrawals exceed
the available liquid resources,
λb Nb ≥ θb. (1)
We assume that all bank creditors have common payoffs, which are summarized in Table






Table 2: Typical bank creditor’s payoffs.
from the unit claim held against the bank. Thus, the net payoff from withdrawing is
Cb ≤ 1, which is independent of whether the bank defaults or survives.4 If, however,
the creditor rolls over his loan and the bank survives, he is paid back Db > 1, which
includes both the original amount lent, plus additional interest payments. Finally, if the
bank defaults, then creditors who rolled over their loans receive a fraction ` of their unit
claim. We interpret ` as the payment stemming from a bank liability guarantee scheme.
In what follows, we assume that ` is exogenously financed and that creditors receive the
amount whenever it comes due. We further assume that Db > Cb ≥ ` ≥ 0, which entails
that creditors face a coordination problem.5
3.2. Tripartite classification of the fundamental
The bank debt rollover game exhibits a tripartite classification of the fundamental
θb, which is a characteristic of such coordination games.6 For θb < 0, the bank always
4The fact that creditors always receive Cb when they choose to foreclose deserves some comment. The in-
terpretation of θb as available liquid resources implies that the bank is unable to pay one unit per claimant
for θb < θ̂b. A more plausible setup would then be to impose a ‘sequential service constraint’ and assume
that creditors receive only a fraction of the available resources in the case of bank default, which may
be determined by θb, the fraction λb and possible transaction costs. The resulting payoff from withdraw-
ing would inherit a negative dependency on λb. However, the realism added by modeling the problem in
this way has to be traded off against technical difficulties that arise due to the resulting partial strate-
gic complementarities. The proof of equilibrium employed above relies on the existence of global strategic
complementarities, i.e. creditors’ actions strictly decrease in λb. But with the more realistic assumption
of a ‘sequential service constraint’, the expected payoff differential (rolling over vs withdrawing) becomes
increasing in λb over a certain range. However, as Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) show, under the alterna-
tive assumption of the payoff differential obeying a single-crossing property, the nature of the equilibrium
remains unaltered. There is still a unique symmetric threshold equilibrium. Under the further restriction
to uniform distributions, there are also no other non-threshold equilibria. However, this proof is more in-
volved, leading to more complicated comparative statics calculations that continue to remain qualitatively
the same. Thus, to keep the model tractable, we stick to the less realistic assumption that the payoff from
withdrawing is fully safe which guarantees the global strategic complementarity property. This is also in
line with standard practice in the literature, e.g. Chui et al. (2002) or Morris and Shin (2006). Rochet and
Vives (2004) further motivate this approach by appealing to institutional managers who seek to make the
right decision, while their payoffs do not depend directly on the face value of their claims.
5For simplicity, we deliberately ignore the possibility of default due to insolvency at some later date
which may occur even though the rollover has been successfully managed.
6See e.g. Diamond and Dybvig (1983), in the context of bank-runs, and Obstfeld (1996) in the context of
currency crises.
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defaults, irrespective of the fraction λb of creditors who foreclose. We refer to this as the
fundamental insolvency case or the efficient default. It is a dominant action for creditors
to withdraw in this case. For θb > Nb, the bank always survives, even if all creditors were
to foreclose their loans. Here it is dominant for all creditors to rollover their loans.
If θb < 0, there exists a unique Nash–equilibrium where all creditors withdraw and
the bank defaults. For θb > Nb, there is a unique Nash–equilibrium where all creditors
rollover their loans and the bank survives. However, under the assumptions of common
knowledge of θb, the game exhibits multiple equilibria – in pure strategies – for inter-
mediate values θb ∈ [0, Nb]. The equilibria in this interval are sustained by common
self-fulfilling expectations about the behavior of other creditors. In one equilibrium, each
creditor expects that all other creditors will withdraw, and hence withdrawing is the best
response to this belief. In aggregate, this leads to the bank’s default, which validates the
initially held beliefs. In the second equilibrium, each creditor expects all other creditors
to rollover their loans. This implies that each creditor chooses to rollover as the best re-
sponse to this belief. The resulting outcome is one where the bank survives, which once
again vindicates the beliefs of creditors.7
3.3. Information structure and strategies
To eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria we use the global games approach and relax
the assumption of common knowledge about θb. This is replaced by a weaker assump-
tion that creditors have heterogeneous and imperfect information concerning the bank’s
fundamental. Specifically, creditors receive private signals about the fundamental before
choosing their action. The signals are modeled as xnb = θb +εnb , where εnb is an idiosyn-
cratic i.i.d. noise term uniformly distributed over the support [−εb,εb]. Following the
literature on transparency, i.e., Heinemann and Illing (2002), Bannier and Heinemann
(2005), and Lindner (2006), we interpret εb as the degree of balance sheet transparency in
the banking sector. When εb is small there is a high degree of transparency, as the signals
that bank creditors receive enable them to better infer the true fundamental from their
observed signals. Creditors use their private signals and the commonly known prior to
form individual posteriors θb|xnb by means of Bayesian updating. Furthermore, to apply
global game methods, we need to ensure that the support of the fundamental distribution
is sufficiently large to include an upper and a lower dominance region.8
A strategy for a typical creditor is a complete plan of action that determines for each
realization of the signal whether the creditor rolls over or withdraws. Formally, a strategy
is a mapping snb : xnb 7→ {0,1}. Strategies are symmetric if snb (·) = sb(·) for all nb. A
strategy is called a threshold strategy if a creditor chooses to withdraw for all xnb below
some critical x̂nb and rolls over otherwise. Finally, a symmetric threshold strategy is a
threshold strategy where all creditors use the same critical x̂b.
7See Morris and Shin (2003).
8Given the support of the signal error, a creditor knows for sure that the bank will default whenever
he receives a signal xnb <−εb (even if all other creditors roll over). And similarly, whenever he receives a
signal xnb > Nb+εb, he knows for sure that the bank will survive (even if all other creditors withdraw). We
assume that the support of θb is sufficiently large to include states where all creditors find either rolling
over or withdrawing dominant, i.e.
[−2εb, Nb +2εb]⊂ [−ηb,θ0b +ηb].
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3.4. Equilibrium
A symmetric equilibrium of the bank debt rollover game, with heterogeneous informa-
tion, is given by the strategy sb(·) and aggregate choice λ(θb) such that creditors maximize







It is a well established result that coordination games, like our bank debt rollover
game, exhibit a unique equilibrium in symmetric threshold strategies.9 The following
proposition re-states this result in terms of our model.
Proposition 1. The bank debt rollover game has a unique equilibrium summarized by
the tuple (x̂b, θ̂b) where













Creditors with signals xnb withdraw if xnb < x̂b and rollover if xnb > x̂b. The bank defaults
if and only if θb < θ̂b.
Proof. See Morris and Shin (2003) for the proof of existence and uniqueness and the
Appendix for the calculations of Equations (2) and (3).
3.5. Changes to the guarantee size
Albeit stylized, we interpret ` as the payment from a bank liability guarantee scheme
provided by the government. Creditors receive ` in the event that they rollover their
loans and the bank defaults. If creditors choose to withdraw their loans, they always
receive Cb. In absence of the guarantee, i.e. `= 0, bank creditors will choose to rollover
their loans as long as the probability attached to the bank’s survival is sufficiently high.
In terms of the payoffs, they will rollover as long as the spread between Db and Cb is
large enough to compensate for incurring the risk of ending up with a zero payoff in case
of bank default. A positive guarantee ` > 0 reduces the opportunity cost of rolling over
(given by Cb−`) and therefore increases creditors’ incentives to rollover. All other things
equal, a larger guarantee lowers the critical thresholds θ̂b and x̂b, and leads to a higher
ex ante survival probability,
∂θ̂b
∂`
= Nb (Cb −Db)
(Db −`)2
< 0.
3.6. Transparency and expected costs of a guarantee
Such comparative static results and conclusions may have contributed to the widely
held perception that bank liability guarantee schemes are a costless measure to shore up
confidence in financial institutions. And while it is true, that the guarantee serves as a
device to change the incentives of creditors to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium, the
9See Morris and Shin (2003). For a general class of distributions of the fundamental other than the
uniform distribution, uniqueness requires that the private signals of creditors are sufficiently precise, i.e.
εb to be sufficiently small.
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question remains whether this is indeed a costless policy. To better appreciate the con-
ditions under which this holds true, consider the case where creditors face only strategic
uncertainty about the behavior of other creditors and no fundamental uncertainty about
the true realization of θb. This corresponds to a high degree of balance sheet trans-
parency with εb → 0, which implies that x̂b → θ̂b. All creditors now receive almost the
same signal and as they all use the same threshold strategy around x̂b, in equilibrium,
either everyone rolls over and the bank survives or everyone forecloses and the bank de-
faults. The payoffs to the creditors are either Db, if everyone rolls over their loans, or
Cb if they all withdraw. While the guarantee payment ` raises the creditors’ incentives
to rollover, it is never paid out. A policymaker could therefore issue an arbitrarily large
guarantee and effectively control the likelihood of default without ever having to follow
up on its promises. In particular, by setting ` = Cb, the bank’s failure threshold con-
verges to θ̂b = 0 such that only a fundamentally insolvent bank defaults. By making such
a choice, a policy maker can exclude inefficient bank runs due to coordination failures.10
The result, that guarantees are costless, changes, however, with a lower degree of
balance sheet transparency and creditors facing fundamental uncertainty, i.e. εb > 0. In
this case, some creditors may decide to rollover their loans due to ‘misleading’ signals
xnb > x̂b, even though θb < θ̂b and the bank defaults. These creditors become benefactors
of the guarantee scheme and receive `. Denote by γb the fraction of agents who receive
the guarantee payment. By the law of large numbers, γb equals the probability that a
single signal xnb is above x̂b conditional on the realized θb i.e.,
γ(θb, x̂b, θ̂b)=

0 if θb > θ̂b
θb−x̂b+εb
2εb
if x̂b −εb < θb < θ̂b
0 if θb < x̂b −εb
(4)
Figure 1 plots λb and γb against the fundamental θb for the cases of full balance sheet
transparency, εb = 0, (dashed lines) and with lower transparency, εb > 0 (solid lines).
In the case of full transparency, λb is a step function with a jump discontinuity at θ̂b,
while γb is always equal to 0. With lower transparency, however, λb decreases linearly
from 1 to 0 over the range [x̂b − εb, x̂b + εb], while γb increases linearly in θb from 0 to
(θ̂b− x̂b+εb)/2εb, over the range [x̂b−εb, θ̂b]. This illustrates the potential costs stemming
from the guarantee scheme. The ex ante expected fraction of agents who benefit from
the guarantee, and hence expected costs, are decreasing in the degree of balance sheet
transparency. When balance sheet transparency is rather low, creditors’ information is
widely dispersed and many creditors may erroneously believe that the bank may not
default even if, in fact, it does. These creditors, in turn, become eligible for the guarantee
payment.
Several vital questions arise from these considerations. To which extent do the costs
stemming from the guarantee pose a threat to the guarantor’s own solvency or liquidity
position? Are guarantees still effective in reducing the likelihood of bank default when-
ever one takes the funding risk of the guarantor into account? What are the effects of
variations in bank and guarantor liquidity parameters on the behavior of creditors? In
what follows, we answer these questions by explicitly modeling the guarantor’s, i.e. the
government’s, funding risks.
10Such a policy has its counterpart in the lender-of-last-resort policy of many major central banks that
follow Bagehot’s rule and grant liquidity and emergency assistance only against eligible collateral to banks











Figure 1: Upper diagram: Fraction of bank creditors who withdraw, λb. Lower diagram: Fraction of
bank creditors who receive guarantee payment, γb. The case εb = 0 is represented by the dotted lines,
whereas the case εb > 0 is represented by solid lines. An increase in εb does not affect θ̂b, but it changes x̂b




2 so that x̂
′
b < θ̂b if εb > 0.
4. Bank debt rollover game in the face of sovereign funding risk
4.1. Model description
Building on the canonical bank debt rollover model we now explicitly introduce the re-
financing problem of the government that issued the guarantee. In case of bank default,
the government pays out ` to those bank creditors that rolled over their loans. How-
ever, the government is itself facing a rollover game involving a set of sovereign creditors
ng ∈ [0, Ng] who are all different from the bank’s creditors. We normalize the mass of
sovereign creditors to unity, Ng ≡ 1. Each sovereign creditor holds a claim with a face
value of one monetary unit against the government. Sovereign creditors decide simulta-
neously whether to continue lending to the government, or to withdraw. The government
defaults whenever its liquid resources are insufficient to service debt foreclosures and
guarantee payments. We represent the government’s liquidity by the random variable
θg, which is uniformly distributed over [−ηg,θ0g + ηg], where θ0g/2 is the ex-ante mean
recourse to liquidity. Moreover, with respect to the relation between θb and θg we impose
the following
Assumption: The government’s liquidity, θg, and the bank’s liquidity, θb, are inde-
pendently distributed.
Sovereign creditors receive noisy signals xng = θg + εng concerning the government’s
liquidity θg, where εng is a uniform i.i.d. random variable, with support [−εg,εg]. As in
the banking game, reduced information dispersion, i.e. a lower εg is associated with a
higher degree of transparency of the government. By assumption, the signals of bank and
sovereign creditors are completely uninformative about the fundamental of the respective
other entity.
Table 4 gives the payoffs in the sovereign rollover game. A sovereign creditor who
withdraws early receives Cg < 1 which is the unit claim, less potential transaction costs.
If the government survives, creditors who rolled over their loans receive Dg. If the gov-







Table 3: Typical sovereign creditor’s payoffs.
guarantee in place for them.
The bank’s creditors, however, continue to enjoy the benefit of a guarantee in case the
bank defaults and the government survives. The payoffs for a typical bank creditor are
shown in Table 4 where we have normalized Cb = 1 in order to reflect the relatively small
transaction costs in bank funding markets.
Bank Default
Bank Survive
Govt Survive Govt Default
Bank Creditor
Withdraw Cb = 1 Cb = 1 Cb = 1
Rollover ` 0 Db
Table 4: Updated bank creditor’s payoffs.
As our assumption of independence between sovereign and banking sector liquidity
appears restrictive, some comments are in order.
• Firstly, the assumption should be judged against the clear but narrow objective of
our paper, namely that we want to demonstrate how, and to what extent, the intro-
duction of a guarantee induces a dependency between the refinancing situation of
sovereign and banking sector. For example, it is by now widely known that some
euro area members got stuck in a ‘diabolic loop’ where problems in the banking
sector and problems of the sovereign tend to amplify each other. One casual expla-
nation for the high exposure of sovereigns vis–a–vis their banking sectors that is
usually put forth is that governments, through the issuance of guarantees, linked
their own funding situation with that of the bank.11 Yet this implies that the ob-
served correlation has been caused, among other things, by governments issuing
guarantees. It was not necessarily present before the introduction of guarantees.
From this perspective, our objective in this paper is to provide analytical under-
pinnings to this side of the diabolic loop. The simplest setting for such an analysis
is one where, absent the guarantee, no dependency between the two coordination
games exists.
• Secondly, as our focus is on liquidity crises, one can argue that the correlation
between the banking sector’s liquidity and that of its government is rather low.
Indeed, the liquidity of the government is essentially determined by its revenues
from taxes, public dues and tariffs. In contrast, as Shin (2012) notes, internation-
ally active banks may tap domestic as well as international markets and can issue
a greater variety of financial instruments. Moreover, if banks have branches in
other countries, there may be intra-banking group liquidity transactions, so that
11See e.g. DIW (2012).
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the bank’s liquidity may depend on the economic fundamentals in those countries
as well. Consequentially, the liquidity situation of banks need not be strongly cor-
related with the liquidity situation of their resident government. Figure A2 illus-
trates this for the case of Ireland. The top panel of Figure A2 plots foreign claims
of Irish banks on banks in other countries against the Irish government’s revenue,
both as fractions of Irish GDP. As can be readily gleaned, the linear correlation
between the time-series is low. The bottom panel of Figure A2 shows claims of
banks in foreign countries on Irish banks against the Irish government’s revenue,
expressed relative to Irish GDP. Once again, the linear correlation between the se-
ries is close to zero. The claims of, and on Irish banks serve as a proxy for θb, while
government revenue captures θg. As such, Figure A2 provides some evidence in
favor of our independence assumption.
• Finally, on purely technical grounds, the assumption of independence allows us to
devise a simple proof for the existence of a unique equilibrium in threshold strate-
gies and the non-existence of equilibria in other strategies. The intuition behind
this result is straightforward. Assumption 1 implies that a bank (sovereign) credi-
tor’s signal is only informative about the liquidity situation of the bank (sovereign),
but completely uninformative about the liquidity of the sovereign (bank). We can
therefore treat the behavior of sovereign creditors in the bank rollover game, re-
spectively the bank creditors in the sovereign game, as exogenously given. Hence,
given any arbitrary strategy used by creditors in the other group, each rollover
game has a unique equilibrium in threshold strategies. The following Proposition
summarizes this result.
Proposition 2. There exists a unique equilibrium where sovereign and bank creditors
use threshold strategies. There are no other equilibria in non-threshold strategies.
Proof. See Appendix.
As a consequence of Proposition 2 we restrict our attention to threshold strategies
for sovereign and bank creditors. Absent a guarantee, ` = 0, the two rollover problems
are independent of each other and the critical thresholds for the government and the
bank can be calculated from the respective formulae in Proposition 1. However, once
the government issues a guarantee ` > 0, its refinancing problem becomes tied to the
bank’s rollover problem. For states of the world where the bank defaults, the government
faces additional costs due to the guarantee payout. This alters the critical threshold for
sovereign creditors, which in turn changes the government’s default point in all states
of the world, even in those where the bank survives. Moreover, the possibility that the
government may default changes the critical threshold of bank creditors and thus the
bank’s default point.
We now turn to an explicit derivation of the threshold equilibrium. Firstly, we solve
for the bank’s and the government’s default conditions. Secondly, we exploit indifference
of agents at the threshold signal to characterize the equilibrium.
4.2. Bank and sovereign default conditions
The possibility of government default does not alter the bank’s failure condition,
which remains λb Nb > θb. Suppose that bank creditors use a threshold strategy around
x̂b. From Equation (2), we obtain that the bank’s default point, θ̂b, can be written as a
14





Thus, the bank fails if and only if θb < θ̂b(x̂b).
In calculating the government’s failure point we must distinguish between two cases.
First, if θb > θ̂b, the bank survives, and the government does not payout the guarantee.
Assuming that government creditors use a symmetric threshold strategy around x̂g, the
government defaults whenever λg > θg, where λg is the fraction of sovereign creditors
whose signals are below x̂g. The government’s failure point is calculated as the solution





Second, suppose θb < θ̂b and the bank defaults. The government is obliged to pay `
to each bank creditor who rolled over their loan. Since bank creditors use the thresh-
old strategy around x̂b, we can use Equation (4) to calculate total guarantee payments,



















`Nb (θb +εb − x̂b)
1+2εg
.








εb(1+2εg) (θb +εb − x̂b) if θb < θ̂b(x̂b)
(6)
The government defaults if and only if θg < θ̂g(x̂g, x̂b,θb).
4.3. Creditors’ expected payoffs
Given the default points of bank and government, we now turn to the differences in
expected payoffs for typical bank and sovereign creditors who observe signals xnb and
xng , respectively, and believe that all other bank and sovereign creditors are using the
threshold strategy around x̂b and x̂g, respectively.
For the typical bank creditor with signal xnb , the expected payoff difference between



















du − 1, (7)
where
σg = (θ0g +2ηg) , and σ̃g = θ0g +ηg ,
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are the width of the support for the θg and the upper bound of the support, respectively.
The second summand is the payment from the guarantee ` multiplied by the probability
that the bank creditor attaches to the survival of the government.
The difference in expected payoffs from rolling over and foreclosing for a typical















du − Cg, (8)
where
σb = (θ0b +2ηb) , and σ̃b = θ0b +ηb ,
are the width of the support for θb and the upper bound, respectively. Using the piecewise





















Note further that no guarantee payments come due in the case that all bank creditors
receive signals xnb < x̂b and withdraw. By virtue of the uniform distribution assumption,
the signals lie on the interval [θb − εb,θb + εb]. If the upper bound θb + εb is less than
the threshold x̂b, all creditors will withdraw. Thus, for realizations of the fundamental
θb < x̂b−εb, the bank fails, but because all bank creditors withdrew, no guarantee payout
is made by the government. Utilizing this fact, we can finally write the payoff difference



















From Proposition 2, we know that there exists a unique equilibrium in threshold
strategies. Creditors who receive the critical signals (x̂b, x̂b) must be indifferent between










and πg(x̂g, x̂b, xg)≷ 0 if and only if xng ≷ x̂g.
An equilibrium is a combination of critical signals that solves simultaneously solves
Equations (10) and (11). We explore properties of the equilibrium using graphical tech-
niques.
Proposition 3. The solutions to creditors’ indifference conditions, Equations (10) and (11)
can be characterized by functions fb and fg where x̂b = fb(x̂g) and x̂g = fg(x̂b). Moreover,










Figure 2: Best reply curves fb and fg. The joint equilibrium in the roll over games occurs at the
intersection point (x̂∗b , x̂
∗
g).
The functions fb and fg can be interpreted as aggregate best response functions be-
tween bank and sovereign creditors. The equilibrium of the model is then given by the
intersection of the two curves.
Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium. The best response curve for bank creditors, fb,
is strictly increasing over the entire range of x̂g, implying that the actions of sovereign
creditors are strategic complements for bank creditors. As sovereign creditors increase
their critical signal, the risk of a government default increases and the likelihood that the
guarantee will be paid out decreases. In response, bank creditors increase their critical
signal as well. In contrast, fg is strictly decreasing over the entire range of x̂b, implying
that the actions of bank creditors are strategic substitutes for sovereign creditors. This









Suppose that bank creditors increase their critical signal x̂b. This exerts two oppos-
ing effects on sovereign creditors’ payoffs, and thus on their critical signal x̂g. Firstly, a
higher x̂b increases θ̂b and enlarges the range of θb realizations where the bank may de-
fault and the guarantee comes due. This, in turn, decreases sovereign creditors’ expected
payoffs from rolling over and leads them to increase their critical signal as well. From
the expression above, this effect is, up to a constant, given by
(θ̂b +εb − x̂b)
∂θ̂b
∂x̂b
There is, however, a second, opposing effect. As x̂b increases, fewer bank creditors
mistakenly rollover their debt whenever the bank fails. Consequently, the guarantee
payout for the government is lowered. This is true for all states θb < θ̂b. In turn, the
likelihood that the government survives rises and a typical sovereign creditor’s expected
payoff from rolling over increases. Formally, this effect is, up to the same constant, given
by
−(θ̂b +εb − x̂b).







leading to the downward sloping aggregate best response curve for the sovereign credi-
tors.
4.5. Comparative statics
We now analyze the comparative statics properties of the critical signals with respect
to the guarantee size `, the degree of bank’s funding illiquidity Nb, and the ex-ante
expected liquidities θ0b and θ
0
g for bank and government, respectively.
Figure 3(a) depicts the effects of a marginal increase in `. The increase shifts the fb
curve to the left. For any given x̂g, a higher guarantee increases bank creditors expected
payoff from rolling over, and lowers their critical signal. The fg–curve is shifted to the
right. For any given x̂b, a higher guarantee lowers the probability that the government
survives and, in response, sovereign creditors raise their critical signal. The increase in
the guarantee thereby exerts a direct effect on the payoffs for both bank and sovereign
creditors, as well as an indirect effect through a change in the respective other type of
creditors’ critical signal. For sovereign creditors both effects work in the same direction
and produce a clear-cut total effect. For bank creditors, the two effects work in opposite
directions. An increase in the critical signal of sovereign creditors lowers bank creditors’
expected payoffs from rolling over and thereby counters the positive effect of the higher
guarantee. If, however, the rightward shift in the fg curve is sufficiently small, then
the latter effect outweighs the former and bank creditors’ critical signal is lowered. The
following Lemma provides a necessary and sufficient condition for this to occur.
Proposition 4. A marginal increase in the guarantee lowers bank creditors’ critical sig-







du < σ̃g − θ̂g(θ̂b) (12)
Proof. See proof of Lemma A6 in the Appendix.
The left–hand side of condition (12) is the ex ante expected guarantee payout, condi-
tional on the government surviving. The right–hand side is the difference between the
government’s maximal cash–flow, i.e. the upper bound σ̃g of the support for θg, and the
minimal, cash flow it needs to survive. We may interpret the right–hand side as the
“slack" in available liquidity for the government. A marginal increase in the guarantee
leads bank creditors to decrease their critical signal if and only if the ex ante expected
guarantee payout is less than the government’s slack in liquidity. Condition (12) can
thus be interpreted as a “credibility condition”. We say that a guarantee ` = ˜̀ is credi-
ble if condition (12) is satisfied when evaluated at ` = ˜̀. If condition (12) fails to hold,
bank creditors may ex ante judge government’s resources to be insufficient to cover the
guarantee promise and respond by raising their critical signal. It is straightforward to
show that the condition always holds for `= 0, implying that the introduction of a small
guarantee is always credible and lowers bank creditors’ critical signal. However, as the
following corollary states, if a guarantee is credible, then further increases in the guar-
antee can lead to a reversal of the condition, i.e. by increasing the expected burden on
the government’s budget, the guarantee erodes its own credibility.
Corollary 1. Suppose condition (12) is satisfied for a given guarantee ˜̀. A further
marginal increase in the guarantee increases the the ex-ante expected guarantee payout,
while at the same time diminishes the government’s slack of liquidity.
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Panel (a): Change in (x̂∗b , x̂∗g ) due to increase in guarantee from ` to `′ ,


































Panel (c): Change in (x̂∗b , x̂∗g ) due to increase in bank’s expected liquidity



















Panel (d): Change in (x̂∗b , x̂∗g ) due to increase in government’s
expected liquidity from θ0g /2 to θ
0′
g /2.
Figure 3(b) depicts the effect of an increase in the bank’s exposure to funding illiquid-
ity, Nb. A higher degree of funding illiquidity is associated with a higher probability of
bank failure and consequently with larger expected guarantee payments. Thus, increases
in Nb shift both the fb and fg curves to the right. This leads to a higher critical signal
for bank creditors. From the graphical analysis alone, the sign of the effect on sovereign
creditors’ critical signal is not clear-cut. On one hand, a larger Nb increases the ex-ante
guarantee payments, which diminishes the government’s liquidity and increases the crit-
ical signal for sovereign creditors (given ` and x̂b). However, as a consequence of strategic
substitutability, a higher critical signal for bank creditors makes sovereign creditors more
willing to roll over, thereby mitigating the effect on the sovereign creditors’ critical signal.
As shown in Lemma A6 in the Appendix, the latter ‘substitutability effect’ is smaller in
magnitude than the former, complementarities effect, implying that a larger Nb always
leads to an increase in sovereign creditors’ critical signal.
Figures 3(c) and 3(d) finally depict the effects of increases in the ex ante expected
liquidity for the bank, θ0b, and government, θ
0
g, respectively. An increase in θ
0
b leaves
the fb–curve unaffected and shifts fg to the left, thereby lowering the critical signals
for both, bank and sovereign creditors. The decisions of bank creditors are based on
updated information on θb that is obtained from the signals xnb , which do not depend
on θ0b. Sovereign creditors, on the other hand, do not receive updated information about
θb, and must instead reply on θ0b. A higher ex-ante liquidity for the bank raises the
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probability that the bank survives and lowers the government’s expected payments due to
the guarantee promise. This in turn increases sovereign creditors’ expected payoffs from
rolling over and lowers their critical signal. By virtue of the strategic complementarities,
the lowering of x̂g leads to a lowering of the critical signal x̂b for the bank’s creditors.
An increase in θ0g, on the other hand, has a markedly different effect. Following sim-
ilar lines of reason as discussed above, θ0g affects only bank creditors’ expected payoffs
and leaves sovereign creditors’ expected payoffs unaffected. An increase in θ0g then in-
creases the likelihood that the government manages to roll over its debt and therefore it
increases the probability that the guarantee can be paid out. This leads bank creditors
to lower their critical signal. However, since the actions of bank creditors are strategic
substitutes for sovereign creditors, the critical signal for sovereign creditors is increased.
These results suggest that whenever bank and sovereign are connected through the
guarantee promise, a positive spill-over effect exists from the bank’s liquid resources to
the likelihood that the government manages its debt roll over and survives. Similarly,
an improvement in the government’s ex ante liquidity also spills over to the likelihood
that the bank survives. Yet, this comes at the cost of a higher critical signal of sovereign
creditors which, in turn, may jeopardize the beneficial effect of the improved θ0g on the
government’s likelihood of managing the debt roll over.
5. The optimal guarantee and its properties
In this section we determine the optimal guarantee based on a stylized measure for
expected costs of crises. Moreover, we discuss how the guarantee affects the probabilities
of sovereign default, bank default, and dual default (a systemic crisis).
5.1. A measure for expected costs of crises
In determining the appropriate guarantee to provide the bank’s creditors, the gov-
ernment faces a trade-off between lowering the expected costs stemming from a bank
default and placing additional strains on its own budget, and thus raising the likelihood
that it enters into default itself. We formalize this trade-off by defining a measure for the
expected costs of crises, which the government minimizes by setting ` optimally.
We denote by φb the costs incurred when the bank default and the government sur-
vives. Similarly, φg denotes the costs from a sovereign default, where the bank survives.
Finally, the costs of a systemic crisis, i.e. a crisis where both, government and bank de-
fault is denoted φs. We normalize all costs by setting φs ≡ 1. We interpret the costs as the
loss in the economy’s output that materializes following a default event. In particular,
φb results from a disruption in financial intermediation and the reduction in available
bank credit in the aftermath of default. Banks typically make sizable investments into
screening and monitoring technologies, and build long-term relationships with borrow-
ers. Following a bank default, the soft information accrued is lost and has to be acquired
anew, which involves costs for the economy as a whole. Moreover, due to the specificity of
this information, some of the bank’s borrowers cannot easily find a new bank and may be-
come credit constrained. Such constraints may become binding for households and small
businesses who, in being confronted with high costs from attempting to borrow on finan-
cial markets directly, are highly dependent on financial intermediation via the banking
sector.12
12See, for example Leland and Pyle (1977) and Allen and Gale (2001).
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Similarly, φg is the foregone output due to a sovereign default. The default may
impose reputation costs on the government, implying higher borrowing costs in the future
or even a full exclusion from financial markets. A government default may also exert a
negative effect on trade through either sanctions and retaliations, or through reduced
access to trade credit. Moreover, empirically, sovereign default is also associated with an
immediate effect on economic growth in the default period.13
Denoting by K(`) the expected default costs stemming from the different scenarios,






)+φb (Pb(`)− q(`))+ q(`), (13)
where Pg(`) denotes the probability that the government defaults, Pb(`) stands for the
probability that the bank defaults and q(`) is the probability of a systemic crisis.
We compare the expected costs under the optimally chosen guarantee, denoted by
K opt ≡ K(`opt), to two benchmarks, (1) the first-best outcome, KFB, that occurs in the
absence of coordination risks for both sovereign and bank creditors, and (2) the costs
K0 ≡ K(0) incurred in the absence of a guarantee.
Without coordination failures, the government and the bank default if and only if θb
and θg are less than zero. Following the uniform distribution assumption, the first-best













While KFB provides a floor to the expected costs, the ceiling is given by the costs
incurred in absence of a guarantee, i.e.,










5.2. Probabilities of crises
In what follows, we write the equilibrium critical signals as x̂∗b(`) and x̂
∗
g(`) to empha-
size their dependency on the guarantee `.14 The probabilities of bank, government and
systemic crises, as expressed in the cost function K(`), are
Pb(`)≡Pr
(








q(`)≡Pr({θb < θ̂∗b (`)}∩ {θg < θ̂∗g(`)})
respectively. Moreover, the probability that there is at least one crisis is
Q(`)≡Pr({θb < θ̂∗b (`)}∪ {θg < θ̂∗g(`)}) .
With respect to the probability of a bank default, the guarantee influences θ̂∗b through











13See, for example, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Borensztein and Panizza (2009).
14The default points of government and bank are then written as θ̂∗b (`) ≡ θ̂b(x̂∗b(`)) and θ̂∗g(`,θb) ≡
θ̂g(x̂∗g(`), x̂∗b(`),θb).
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The guarantee’s influence on the probability of a government crisis runs through two
channels. First, there is the effect on the critical signal x̂∗g(`), which induces a level-shift
in the default point θ̂∗g(`,θb). This effect is similar to that induced by the guarantee on
the bank’s default point θ̂∗b (`). Secondly, the government’s default point depends directly
on the bank’s liquidity θb. This induces a functional interdependence between the like-
lihood of a government default and the bank’s liquidity. Calculating the government’s



































where the final term makes clear the functional dependency between the government’s
default probability and the bank’s fundamental. This clearly shows how the government’s
fate does not exclusively lie in the hand of its own creditors but, through the guarantee,
becomes closely tied to that of the bank, even though the liquidity resources that other-
wise govern individual default probabilities are fully independent.






























Figure 4 illustrates the impact of the guarantee on the default points θ̂∗g(`,θb) and
θ̂∗b (`). The guarantee decreases x̂
∗
b(`) and increases x̂
∗
g(`). The dotted lines separate
the regions of default and survival in absence of the guarantee. The introduction of a
guarantee ` shifts the bank’s default point to the left (dashed line) and enlarges the
region where the bank survives. Moreover, as the guarantee increases the sovereign
creditors’ critical signal, the dotted horizontal line moves to the solid line, increasing the
region where the government defaults. In the region where the bank defaults (to the left
of the dashed line), the government’s default point is a function of θb and therefore the
solid line slopes upwards.
5.3. The influence of transparency on the optimal guarantee
The influence of the guarantee in reducing the likelihood of bank default depends
on its ‘credibility’, which in turn is determined by the risk of sovereign default. The
pertinent question is then whether, and to what degree, a particular guarantee promise
undermines the government’s credibility to pay by placing undue strains on its refinanc-
ing needs. As discussed in Section 3.6, the costs associated with a guarantee promise are
crucially dependent on the degree of balance sheet transparency. To better understand
the effects of changes in the degrees of balance sheet transparency, εb and εg, on the
optimal policy, we explore two extreme cases.
5.3.1. Transparent bank
With a high degree of balance sheet transparency for the bank, i.e. εb becoming
















Figure 4: Regions of bank and / or sovereign default in θb–θg–space.
other bank creditors. The coordination failure of bank creditors can be avoided, at zero
cost to the government, by issuing a sufficiently large guarantee promise.15
Lemma 1. In the limit when the bank is fully transparent (εb → 0) and for any degree of


















While sovereign default risk influences the critical threshold θ∗b (`), the guarantee
does not put any additional strains on the government and its threshold converges to the
one in the canonical model. This implies a clear-cut negative effect of a higher guarantee
on the costs of crises K(`). The government’s program has a corner solution.
Lemma 2. If the bank is fully transparent, the first-order necessary condition for the











The optimal guarantee for a fully transparent bank is provided in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 5. If the bank is fully transparent, the optimal guarantee becomes `opt = 1,
and it provides a full coverage of bank creditors’ claims.
Proof. See Appendix.
15This is the result obtained by Bebchuk and Goldstein (2010).
23
Although the full guarantee shrinks the range of fundamentals where inefficient bank
runs occur, it does not completely remove the possibility of inefficient bank failures. As
the government itself defaults with probability Pg, even a full guarantee is not enough





which is tantamount to rewarding bank creditors for a bank failure.
5.3.2. Opaque bank and transparent government
The result presented in Proposition 5 depends only on the transparency of the bank
and is independent of the government’s transparency. Indeed, transparency of the gov-
ernment plays an entirely different role than transparency of the bank. εg has no decisive
influence on whether the guarantee creates an actual cost or not. Equation (17) suggests
that higher government transparency can reduce the guarantee’s effect on the govern-
ment’s critical threshold in those cases when the bank’s balance sheet is rather opaque.
But even when the government is fully transparent, the optimal policy set out in Propo-
sition 5 may change if the bank is opaque. For example, for εb > 0 and εg → 0, the default





























The sign of K ′(`), and hence the optimal guarantee policy, are no longer parameter–
independent. In particular, they crucially depend on the costs of crises φb and φg and
on the remaining parameters governing the model. While conceptually simple, the gov-
ernment’s program does not yield tractable analytical solutions. We therefore resort to
a numerical analysis in order to determine the optimal guarantee and examine its de-
pendency on the degrees of transparency and on the parameters governing the liquidity
situations of government and bank.
6. Numerical analysis
We explore the consequences of changes in the degrees of banking sector and govern-
ment transparency through a set of numerical exercises, where we fix the cost parameters
φb and φg, associated with bank and sovereign defaults respectively, at some empirically
plausible values and where we calibrate, in broad strokes, the model to the Irish economy.
6.1. Calibrating the Celtic crisis
According to Table A1, the first guarantee scheme introduced by the Irish government
covered banking sector liabilities that amounted to 244% of Irish GDP. According to IMF
(2011), the refinancing needs of the Irish banks amounted to around 25% of their total
24
liabilities. This roughly equates to refinancing needs in the order of 61% of GDP. In
contrast, the Irish government faced financing needs of only 19.5% of GDP in 2011. This
implies that the amount of maturing claims of Irish banks was approximately three times
that of the Irish government, implying a value of Nb = 3, where we continue to maintain
Ng = 1. Moreover, in line with the experience prior to the crisis, we assume that the
risk premia of Irish banks were higher than that of the Irish government and thus set
Db = 1.75 and Dg = 1.5. We also set Cb = Cg = 1.
To ensure that the dominance regions of the two rollover games are well-defined, we
take ηb = 4.01, ηg = 1.01, θ0b = 3 and θ0g = 4. Consequently, the banking sector is exposed
to a large rollover risk, with expected liquidity θ0b/2 covering only 50% of total matur-
ing claims. For the government, in contrast, expected liquidity is double the amount of
maturing claims.16
We normalize the cost of a systemic crisis to φs = 1. Cost parameters φb and φg
are thus interpreted as the output losses due to individual bank and sovereign crises,
respectively, relative to the loss due to a systemic crisis. Table 5 provides a brief overview
of the empirical estimates of such losses. The cumulative output losses associated with
a systemic crisis amount to 54% of the pre-crisis GDP. The output loss of a sovereign
default only event is at around 10% of GDP. Estimated losses due to a solo banking crisis
range from 6.3% to 28% of GDP. For the first exercise in this section we set φg = 0.2
(which approximates 10%/54% = 0.185 ≈ 0.2) and φb = 0.1 (approximating 6.3%/54% =
0.116 ≈ 0.1). In the second exercise, we maintain the value of φg, but we change φb to
0.5, thus approximating 28%/54%.
Source Type of crisis Duration Average annual output loss
Hoggarth et al. (2002) Banking 3.2 1.9%
Honohan and Klingebiel (2000) Banking 3.5 3.6%
Hutchison and Noy (2005) Banking 3.3 3.0%
De Paoli et al. (2009) Sovereign 4 2.5%
Twin (Sovereign and Banking) 11 4.9%
John H. Boyd (2005) Banking 5.1 5.4%
Table 5: Costs of different types of crises. Output loss in percent of annual GDP. Reported values are the
average losses reported in the respective studies.
In what follows, we measure the welfare gain from introducing the optimal guarantee
as
welfare= K0 −K opt.
Moreover, in order to assess the impact of the optimal guarantee on the likelihood of
crises, we consider the differences in the probabilities of different crises between having
the optimal guarantee and having no guarantee, i.e. we write
∆Pb ≡ Pb(`opt)−Pb(0) and ∆Pg ≡ Pg(`opt)−Pg(0),
as well as
∆Q ≡Q(`opt)−Q(0) and ∆q ≡ q(`opt)− q(0).
16The choice of ηb allows for variations of εb up to 2, whereas the choice of ηg allows for variations of εg
up to 0.5. As the preceding sections made clear, the choice of εg is of lesser importance for the outcome of
the model, which is why we restrict ourselves to only a limited range of variations.
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6.2. Results
Figure 5 shows the comparative statics exercises with respect to εb and εg where we
have set φg = 0.2 and put the costs of a banking crisis to φb = 0.1. As can be seen from
Panel (a), a lower degree of transparency in the banking sector (higher εb) may decrease
the optimal guarantee. Moreover, as the difference between the black, the gray and the
dashed gray line in Panel (a) indicates, this effect is more pronounced when the degree
of transparency of the government is also lower (i.e. εg is higher). As shown in Panel
(b), the expected welfare gain is highest when transparency of banks and government
is highest and amounts to roughly 1.2% of GDP (≈ 0.022×54%). Reductions in the gov-
ernment’s transparency are associated with an expected welfare loss of at most 0.27% of
GDP. Panels (c)–(f) in Figure 5 show how the probability differences ∆Q, ∆q, ∆Pb and
∆Pg vary with changes in εb and εg. As one would expect, the probability of a sovereign
crisis rises by the introduction of the optimal guarantee. However, it rises less than the
reduction in the probability of a banking crisis, which in turn explains why probabilities
q and Q are decreasing. Higher bank balance sheet transparency is clearly enhancing
the effect of the guarantee on probabilities Pb, q and Q, while it mitigates the adverse
effect on Pg. As already discussed in the previous sections, when the bank becomes fully
transparent (εb → 0), the introduction of a guarantee comes at no cost for the govern-
ment as it is never used and insofar it exerts no effect on the probability Pg. Moreover,
a less transparent government significantly dampens the effect of the guarantee on all
probabilities.
Figure 6 shows the numerical results when φg is kept at 0.2 and when φb = 0.5
thereby approximating the highest output loss of a solo banking crisis in Table 5. Several
important differences emerge compared to the previous exercise. Firstly, as can be seen
from Panel (a), given the high costs of a bank default, the government finds it now opti-
mal to provide a full guarantee (`opt = 1) independent of its own degree of transparency
and the degree of bank transparency. Secondly, from Panel (f), ∆Pg increases linearly
with lower transparency of the banks, yet it is unaffected by changes in the government’s
transparency.17 Thirdly, from Panel (c), a combination of low degree of bank and govern-
ment transparency (high εb and εg) may now increase the probability of experiencing a
systemic crises above the level which obtains in the absence of a guarantee. This effect
is basically driven by the increase in ∆Pg, since, from Panel (e), the change in the prob-
ability of a banking crisis is rather flat. Quantitatively, this effect seems to be rather
small, yet it constitutes a marked qualitative difference to the previous exercise where
the costs of a banking crisis were smaller than the costs of a sovereign crisis. Finally,
the maximum welfare gain (when government and banking sector are quite transparent)
amounts to roughly 2.38% of GDP, which is larger than previously.
A robust finding throughout these numerical exercises is that the increase in the
government’s default probability is, in absolute magnitude, significantly smaller than
the reduction in the bank’s default probability. This replicates the empirical behavior of
CDS–spreads that we alluded to in the introduction (see Figure 1, Panel (d)) and allows
us to put forward an interpretation of this stylized fact. Recall that in our model, un-
der a regime of full bank transparency (ε→ 0), no guarantee payout will ever come due.
This implies, as can be seen from the corresponding panels in Figures 5 and 6, that for a
relatively high degree of bank transparency, the sovereign’s default probability remains
almost unchanged when the guarantee is introduced, whereas the impact on the bank’s
default probability is large. The guarantee removes strategic uncertainty, thereby serv-
17This result is robust to other numerical specifications whenever φb >φg.
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ing as a device to coordinate bank creditors on the efficient equilibrium. When the degree
of bank transparency becomes smaller, the mass of bank creditors who may eventually
claim the guarantee increases and, in case the bank defaults, the guarantee creates an
actual cost burden for the government. As a result, the government’s default probability
begins to increase. The large decrease in CDS spreads across countries (and especially
in Ireland), that was observed right after the issuance of bank debt guarantees, may
therefore mirror the removal of strategic uncertainty among bank creditors. However,
sovereign CDS–spreads increased at the same time, which suggests that the correspond-
ing banking sectors may not have operated under a regime of full transparency. Market
participants in sovereign funding markets may have conjectured that the guarantees
would create an actual cost for the sovereign and therefore withdrew funding.
Moreover, while it is tempting to criticize the Irish government for having provided an
enormous guarantee, at least our numerical exercises suggest that even such a guarantee
may have been the optimal one. In particular, as Ireland’s financial industry constituted
an important sector of its economy, the output costs of an economy–wide banking crisis
may have been quite large so that, as shown by the exercise in Figure 6, for any degree
of transparency the government would have considered a 100% coverage optimal. Yet, if
transparency was rather low, such a policy may have contributed to heighten ex ante the
likelihood of the systemic crisis which Ireland eventually experienced. Figure 6 suggests
that, given the strong reduction in the probability of a relatively costly banking crisis,
the government may optimally drive up the likelihood of its own default, which is less
costly, to save the expected costs of a banking crisis, even if this also means to raise the
probability of a systemic crisis above the level without a guarantee.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the effects of a bank debt guarantee provided by the
government and the role played by the degree of balance sheet transparency in mak-
ing the guarantee costly. To examine this phenomenon, we used a stylized global games
framework to address the following questions: (i) How does the introduction of a bank
liability guarantee by a government affect the behavior of banking and sovereign credi-
tors? (ii) How does the guarantee affect the likelihood of crises? (iii) What is the optimal
guarantee that trades-off the expected costs associated with the different types of crises?
and (iv) How do changes in the parameters governing fundamental uncertainty / trans-
parency and liquidity impact on the optimal guarantee?
As the guarantee promise increases the sovereign’s expected liabilities, sovereign
creditors may lend to the government less often, thereby increasing the government’s
own likelihood of default. This in turn can jeopardize the effectiveness of the guarantee
as bank creditors become less eager to rely on the guarantee when they expect that the
government becomes unable to fund its promises.
Proposition 4 provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the guarantee to be
effective in raising the incentives of bank creditors to roll over their loans. Moreover, our
model provides a theoretical foundation for the empirically observed behavior of credit
default spreads during the recent crisis across the different countries that issued bank
debt guarantees. Our results show a clear cut welfare improvement with greater trans-
parency, which lowers fundamental uncertainty. This would suggest that in designing
guarantee schemes, authorities can improve on their credibility by mandating greater
disclosure on the part of the banks. These findings are in line with the new approaches
being sought by several countries, as discussed in the Basel Committee for Banking Su-
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pervision (2011) report. Moreover, by improving on the government’s own transparency,
these gains can be further enhanced.
While reduced form, the model captures key strategic interactions across sovereign
and bank creditors in the design of optimal guarantee schemes, that are often assumed
exogenous. Such cautionary tales equally apply to the design of new regulations, where
authorities focus on effects in partial, rather than general equilibrium models.
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Figure 5: Comparative statics of εb and εg with φb = 0.1 and φg = 0.2
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Panel (b): Welfare gain: K0 −K opt











Panel (c): Change in probability of systemic crisis: ∆q
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Panel (e): Change in probability of banking crisis: ∆Pb














Panel (f): Change in probability of sovereign crisis: ∆Pg
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Figure 6: Comparative statics of εb and εg with φb = 0.5 and φg = 0.2




























































Panel (b): Welfare gain: K0 −K opt











Panel (c): Change in probability of systemic crisis: ∆q














Panel (d): Change in probability of any crisis: ∆Q














Panel (e): Change in probability of banking crisis: ∆Pb
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Morris and Shin (2003) show that the model has a unique symmetric threshold
equilibrium where creditors use the strategy around x̂b and the bank defaults whenever θb < θ̂b. The
creditor who observes xnb = x̂b must therefore be indifferent between rolling over and foreclosing. Thus,




∣∣ x̂b)+`Pr(θb ≤ θ̂b∣∣ x̂b)−Cb = 0, (A22)








Due to the law of large numbers, λb(θb)=Pr
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xnb ≤ x̂b










































Proof of Proposition 2. By our assumption on the independence between random variables θb and θg,
we can consider each game separately and treat the fundamental and the strategy in the respective other
game as exogenously given. Thus, as shown in the following Lemmas A3 and A4, bank creditors respond
to any strategy played by sovereign creditors by using a unique threshold strategy. Moreover, as shown
in Lemma A5, government creditors respond to any strategy played by bank creditors by using a unique
threshold strategy. As a direct consequence, the unique equilibrium in the model is a threshold equilibrium.
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To prove Lemmas A3 - A5, the following Claims A1 and A2 provide some properties of the payoff
differentials of bank and sovereign creditors respectively.
Denote the fraction of bank creditors who withdraw by λb and suppose that government creditors
play any symmetric strategy sg(xng ). Given the government’s liquidity θg, we can write the fraction of
government creditors who withdraw as
∫ θg+εg
θg−εg s(xng )dxng . The payoff differential between rolling over and
withdrawing for a typical bank creditor can then be written as
πb(θb,λb,θg, sg(·))=

Db −Cb if λb < θb, ∀θg
`−Cb if λb > θb,
∫ θg+εg
θg−εg sg(xng )dxng < θg − (1−λb)`
−Cb if λb > θb,
∫ θg+εg
θg−εg sg(xng )dxng > θg − (1−λb)`
(A25)
Claim A1. Bank creditors’ payoff differential (A25) has the following properties.
1. Action single-crossing in λb: For any θb and θg, there exists λ∗b such that π
b > 0 for any λb < λ∗ and
πb < 0 for any λb >λ∗b .
2. State monotonicity in θb: πb is non-decreasing in θb.
3. Laplacian State Monotonicity: There exists a unique θ∗b such that∫ 1
0
π(θ∗b ,λb,θg, sg(·))dλb = 0.
4. Uniform Limit Dominance: There exist θb and θb such that π
b <−δ for θb < θb and πb > δ for θb > θb
for some δ> 0.
Moreover, the noise distribution satisfies
5. Monotone Likelihood Property.
6. Finite expectations of signals.
Proof of Claim A1. 1. Note that Db −Cb > 0 > `−Cb > −Cb. Action single-crossing then follows by
setting λ∗b = θb.
2. Can be inferred immediately from Equation (A25).
3. We can write the integral
∫ 1














θg−εg sg(xng )dxng )
} dλb = 0.
As the left hand side of the equality sign is negative for θb = 0, positive for θb = 1 and otherwise




b ,λb,θg, sg(·))dλb = 0.
4. The claim follows by setting θb = 0, θb = 1 and δ=min{Cb −`,Db −Cb}.
5. Uniform noise satisfies MLRP, see (Shao, 2003, p. 399).
6. This follows immediately from the assumption of a uniform distribution with bounded support.
Suppose that bank creditors play any strategy sb(xnb ). Given any θb, we can then write the fraction
of bank creditors who withdraw as
∫ θb+εb
θb−εb sb(xnb )dxnb . The payoff differential between rolling over and
withdrawing for a typical government creditor is then given by
πg(θg,λg,θb, sb(·))=

Dg −Cg if λg < θg,
∫ θb+εb
θb−εb sb(xnb )dxnb < θb
Dg −Cg if λg < θg − (1−
∫ θb+εb
θb−εb sb(xnb )dxnb )`,
∫ θb+εb
θb−εb sb(xnb )dxnb > θb
−Cg if λg > θg − (1−
∫ θb+εb
θb−εb sb(xnb )dxnb )`,
∫ θb+εb
θb−εb sb(xnb )dxnb > θb
−Cg if λg > θg, ∀θb
(A26)
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Claim A2. Government creditors’ payoff differential (A26) has the following properties.
1. Action monotonicity in λg: πg is non-increasing in λg.
2. State monotonicity in θg: πg is non-decreasing in θg.
3. Laplacian State Monotonicity: There exists a unique θ∗g such that∫ 1
0
π(θ∗g ,λg,θb, sb(·))dλg = 0.
4. Uniform Limit Dominance: There exist θg and θg such that πg <−δ for θg < θg and πg > δ for θg > θg
for some δ> 0.
Moreover, the noise distribution satisfies
5. Monotone Likelihood Property.
6. Finite expectations of signals.
Proof of Claim A2. 1. Suppose θb >λb, then, since Dg−Cg >−Cg, πg is clearly non-increasing in λg
for any θg. Similarly for the case where θb <λb.
2. Suppose θb >λb, then πg is increasing in θg for any λg. Similarly for θb <λb.
3. If θb >λb, then θ∗g = Cg/Dg. If θb <λb, then θ∗g = Cg/Dg + (1−λb)`.
4. This follows by setting θg = 1+` and θg = 0 and δ= Dg −Cg.
5. Uniform noise satisfies MLRP, see (Shao, 2003, p. 399).
6. This follows immediately from the assumption of a uniform distribution with bounded support.
Lemma A3. For any strategy sg(·) played by government creditors, the rollover game between bank creditors
has a unique threshold equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma A3. Since the payoff differential satisfies properties (1) to (6) in Claim A1, the Lemma
follows from (Morris and Shin, 2003, Lemma 2.3).
Lemma A4. There are no other equilibria in non-threshold strategies.
Proof of Lemma A4. Since noise terms are uniformly distributed and the payoff differential satisfies
action single-crossing, the Lemma follows immediately from the proof to (Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005,
Theorem 1).
Lemma A5. For any strategy sb(·) played by bank creditors, the rollover game between government cred-
itors has a unique equilibrium in threshold strategies. Moreover, there are no equilibria in non-threshold
strategies.
Proof of Lemma A5. Since the payoff differential satisfies properties (1) to (6) in Claim A2, the Lemma
follows immediately from (Morris and Shin, 2003, Proposition 2.2).
Proof of Proposition 3. From the proof of Proposition 2 follows that each game has a unique equilibrium
in threshold strategies. That is, for given x̂g, there exists a unique x̂b that satisfies Equation (10) and for
given x̂b, there exists a unique x̂g that satisfies (11). To see this directly, fix x̂g. Due to the existence of
dominance regions there exist x̂b and x̂b such that π
b(x̂b, x̂g, x̂b) < 0 for any x̂b < x̂b, and πb(x̂b, x̂g, x̂b) > 0
for any x̂b > x̂b. Similarly, for πg(x̂g, x̂b, x̂g). Since πb(·) and πg(·) are continuous they both cross the x-axis
at least once. To show that there is exactly one threshold signal, it suffices to show that πb(x̂b, x̂g, x̂b) is
strictly increasing in x̂b and πg(x̂g, x̂b, x̂g) is strictly increasing in x̂g.













Next, consider the derivative of πb with respect to x̂b. Observe first that θ̂′b(x̂b) = Nb(Nb + 2εb)−1
and (1− θ̂′b(x̂b)) = 2εb(Nb +2εb)−1. Moreover, if θb < θ̂b, then ∂θ̂g/∂x̂b = −`Nbεg(εb(1+2εg))−1. Let θ̂Tg :=
(x̂g + εg)(1+2εg)−1, so that we can write θ̂g(x̂g, x̂b,θb) = θ̂Tg + `Nbεg1+2εg
θb−x̂b+εb
Nb+2εb , while θ̂g(x̂g, x̂b, x̂b − εb) = θ̂
T
g .
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≤ 1 because it is a
probability. Furthermore Nb +εb − x̂b ≥ 0 because the existence of an upper dominance region implies that




The existence of functions fb and fg follows by applying the implicit function theorem to Equations

















du < 0, (A28)

























= NbNb+2εb < 1.
Lemma A6. The signs of the derivatives of the critical signals x̂b and x̂g with respect to parameters
{`, Nb,θ0b,θ
0
g} are given by
dx̂g
d`















< 0 and dx̂g
dθ0g
> 0.
Proof of Lemma A6. Let ξ = (`, Nb,θ0b,θ0g) with typical element ξk. The total effects
dx̂b
dξk
and dx̂gdξk can be






















and thus its determinant is positive, |J| > 0.


































































































− 2`εgNb(θ̂b + x̂b −εb)
2σgεb(1+2εg)
}





+ `εgNb(x̂b −εb − θ̂b)
σgεb(1+2εg)
}
























du < 0. (A32)
Given the signs of Equations (A31) and (A32), it follows from Equations (A29) and (A30) that
dx̂g
d`
> 0 and dx̂b
d`
≶ 0.








































du < σ̃g − θ̂∗g(θ̂∗b ),
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which is condition (12).













(Nb +εb − x̂b)
(Nb +2εb)
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θ̂b − x̂b +εb
)]< 0. (A34)
Given the signs of Equations (A33) and (A34), it follows from Equations (A29) and (A30) that
dx̂b
dNb
> 0, and dx̂g
dNb
≷ 0.












Using Equations (??), (A28), (A33) and (A34), we obtain
Ω
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2Nbεg(θ̂b +εb − x̂b)2
4ε2bσg(Nb +2εb)(1+2εg)
,
where Ω := Db−`
σ̃−θ̂g (θ̂b )
σg
























2Nbεg(θ̂b +εb − x̂b)
εb(1+2εg)σg
> `














> 0, which implies dx̂gdNb > 0.
Finally, the derivatives with respect to θ0b and θ
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Proof of Corollary 1. Suppose ` = ˜̀ and condition (12) holds when evaluated at ˜̀. This implies that
dx̂b( ˜̀)/d`< 0.
















which is positive by the supposition that (12) holds.














which is negative by the supposition that (12) holds.




du if θb < θ̂∗b
0 else
.
Hence, whenever εb → 0, x̂∗b → θ̂∗b and the integral collapses to zero. But then, the guarantee does not
appear anymore in the government’s default condition and the threshold for government default converges













`(σ̃g − θ̂Tg )(θ̂b − x̂b +εb)
σg2εb




Observe that θ̂b− x̂b+εb = 2εb(Nb− x̂b+εb)/(Nb+2εb). Substituting this into the indifference condition and
taking the limit εb → 0 leads to
π̄b(x̂b)= Db x̂b + (1−Pg)`(Nb − x̂b)−Nb = 0,
which can be solved for the critical signal,
















. Since Pg does not depend on `, the derivative of the cost of crises measure with respect
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